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INTRODUCTION 
On December 10, 2013, then-Mayor Michael Bloomberg of New 
York City announced the largest continuous free outdoor public WiFi 
network in the United States.1  The network, covering most of the 
Harlem neighborhood, will extend 95 city blocks and reach nearly 
80,000 residents, including 13,000 public housing occupants, as well as 
businesses in and visitors to the area.2  The project is a joint initiative 
of the City’s Department of Information Technology and 
Telecommunications, its Technology Development Corporation, and 
the private Internet Service Provider Sky-Packets, which will provide 
access to and manage traffic over the network on the City’s behalf.3  
In announcing the project, former Mayor Bloomberg noted that the 
project would provide “24/7 access to everything from education 
materials for kids, to information about Harlem’s rich history and 
attractions, to everyday needs like paying bills [and] checking library 
hours.”4 
The Harlem WiFi project, while notable in its scope, is consistent 
with a growing trend: government-provided access to high-speed 
Internet service is on the rise in cities of all sizes.  Citizens are coming 
to expect “robust and ubiquitous wireless connectivity.”5  This is due 
in large part, of course, to the explosion in demand for faster mobile 
wireless access through smartphones—ownership of which increased 
from 16% of Americans in 2009 to 56% in 2013, a trend roughly 
consistent with the introduction and rising popularity of the iPhone.6 
These offerings are taking a range of forms.  One approach is a 
purely public utility model, i.e., government owned-and-operated, 
mostly city-wide “municipal broadband” networks built out and 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Mayor Bloomberg Announces Country’s Largest Continuous Free Public 
WiFi Network, NYC.GOV (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-
mayor/news/394-13/mayor-bloomberg-country-s-largest-continuous-free-public-wifi-
network/. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. James Eng, Largest Free Public Wi-Fi Network in US Coming to Harlem, 
NBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/largest-free-
public-wi-fi-network-us-coming-harlem-f2D11723755. 
 5. Open Tech. Inst. & CTC Tech. & Energy, The Art of the Possible: An 
Overview of Public Broadband Options, NEW AM. FOUND. 19 (May 6, 2014), 
http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/TheArtofthePossible-
OverviewofPublicBroadbandOptions_NAFOTI-CTC.pdf. 
 6. Aaron Smith, Smartphone Ownership 2013, PEWRESEARCH INTERNET 
PROJECT (June 5, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/06/05/smartphone-
ownership-2013/; see also Open Tech. Inst. & CTC Tech & Energy, supra note 5, at 
19. 
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managed by cities themselves, such as Chattanooga, Tennessee and 
Lafayette, Louisiana.7  Another is the increasingly common public-
private partnership, such as Harlem WiFi, where a private Internet 
Service Provider (ISP) provides Internet access via Hotspot in a 
particular public space such as a neighborhood, business district, park, 
town hall, or transportation hub, thereby aggregating smaller service 
areas within their city limits,8 in cooperation with a municipality or its 
administrative subsidiary, at low or no cost to the user.9  As Mayor 
Bloomberg noted with respect to Harlem WiFi, all of these projects 
are undertaken for manifestly public purposes, from education to 
economic development.10  In addition, an underlying motivation on 
the part of policymakers is likely the fear of being left behind.  
Businesses, residents, and visitors are increasingly expecting high-
speed Internet connections in public spaces, and city leaders seem to 
believe that if they don’t build it, those businesses, residents, and 
visitors will not come. 
Concurrent with these efforts is the growing debate over direct 
governmental provision of high-speed Internet service, due in part to 
the lack of incentives for private ISPs to finance network build-outs 
and improve capacity in rural areas.11  Advocates of “fiber-to-the-
home” (i.e., direct high-speed residential Internet connections 
provided via fiber optic cable) for all Americans have called for 
additional public investment of nearly one hundred billion dollars in 
federal funding, much of which would go to government-owned and 
                                                                                                     
 7. See Brian Fung, How Chattanooga Beat Google Fiber by Half a Decade, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/
2013/09/17/how-chattanooga-beat-google-fiber-by-half-a-decade/; see also 
LAFAYETTE UTIL. SYS. FIBER, http://lusfiber.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2014). 
 8. See, e.g., infra note 25 (discussing, inter alia, efforts by Chicago, Illinois; 
Cambridge, Massachusetts; Kennesaw, Georgia; and Newton, North Carolina). 
 9. For a detailed study of three large cities’ recent efforts to provide free WiFi to 
residents, see SUSAN CRAWFORD ET AL., HARVARD UNIVERSITY BERKMAN CENTER 
FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY, RESEARCH PUB. NO. 2014-9, COMMUNITY FIBER IN 
WASHINGTON, D.C., SEATTLE, WA, AND SAN FRANCISCO, CA: DEVELOPMENTS AND 
LESSONS LEARNED (May 27, 2014), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/publications/2014/
community_fiber; see also infra note 68 (discussing WiFi and cellphone service in 
New York subway system provided via partnerships between the Metropolitan 
Transit Authority and private carrier TransitWireless). 
 10. See infra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. 
 11. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 47 U.S.C. § 1305 
(2012); FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL 
BROADBAND PLAN 135 (2010), available at http://transition.fcc.gov/national-
broadband-plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf; Grant Gross, FCC Votes to End 
Telephone Subsidies, Shift to Broadband, PCWORLD (Oct. 27, 2011, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/242713/fcc_votes_to_end_telephone_subsidies_shift_
to_broadband.html. 
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operated networks. 12   To those advocates, the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”)’s seeming abdication of its 
commitment to network neutrality in April 201413 has highlighted to 
an even greater degree the need to expand municipal-level, utility-run 
networks.  In addition, the FCC itself seems ready to exercise its 
federal preemption authority to protect municipal broadband efforts 
from statewide laws that have inhibited municipal broadband 
networks in several states14—a proposal that the U.S. Council of 
Mayors has recently endorsed.15  For those who believe a subsidy 
approach has not succeeded in ensuring high-speed Internet access to 
                                                                                                     
 12. See, e.g., SUSAN CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE AUDIENCE: THE TELECOM INDUSTRY 
AND MONOPOLY POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 255–57 (2013); see also Sam 
Gustin, Is Broadband Internet Access a Public Utility?, TIME (Jan. 9, 2013), 
http://business.time.com/2013/01/09/is-broadband-internet-access-a-public-utility/; 
Alex Marshall, Who Should Control Broadband?, GOVERNING MAG. (Apr. 2013), 
http://www.governing.com/columns/eco-engines/col-public-or-private-sector-who-
controls-broadband.html. 
 13. See, e.g., Marvin Ammori, The Case for Net Neutrality: What’s Wrong With 
Obama’s Internet Policy, FOREIGN AFF. (July/Aug. 2014), 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141536/marvin-ammori/the-case-for-net-
neutrality. 
 14. See Susan Crawford, Op-Ed., The Wire Next Time, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/28/opinion/the-wire-next-time.html?_r=0; Tom 
Wheeler, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Remarks Before the National Cable & 
Telecommunications Association (Apr. 30, 2014), available at https://apps.fcc.gov/
edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-326852A1.pdf; Tom Wheeler, Removing Barriers to 
Competitive Community Broadband, FCC.GOV BLOG (June 10, 2014), 
http://www.fcc.gov/blog/removing-barriers-competitive-community-broadband.  Two 
communities that wish to provide broadband service to other municipalities have 
already asked the FCC to preempt state laws they view as obstructive of that goal, 
and the Commission has opened a proceeding to consider those 
requests. See Petition Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996 for Removal of State Barriers to Broadband Investment and Competition, filed 
by Electric Power Board, Chattanooga, Tennessee, WC Docket No. 14-116 (filed July 
24, 2014); Petition Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
for Removal of State Barriers to Broadband Investment and Competition, filed by 
City of Wilson, North Carolina, WC Docket No. 14-115 (filed July 24, 2014). 
 15. See TRANSP. & COMMC’NS COMM., 82ND ANNUAL MEETING OF THE U.S. 
CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, RESOLUTION ON PRESERVING A FREE AND OPEN 
INTERNET 257 (June 2014), available at http://www.usmayors.org/
82ndAnnualMeeting/media/resolutions-final.pdf; see also Susan Crawford, How 
Cities Can Take On Big Cable, BLOOMBERGVIEW (June 27, 2014), 
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-06-27/how-cities-can-take-on-big-cable 
(citing letter sent by Democratic congressional leaders to FCC asking agency to 
preempt state laws in order to encourage municipal broadband development); 
Andrew Zaleski, Is Municipal Broadband More Important than Net Neutrality?, 
FORTUNE (June 26, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/06/26/is-municipal-broadband-
more-important-than-net-neutrality/. 
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all Americans, direct government provision of fiber-based service 
seems to be the only solution.16 
This “fundamental makeover” of public places from exclusively 
physical spaces to mixed spaces with both physical and online aspects 
is “alter[ing] the nature, character, and democratic functions of public 
places and public expression,” in a range of ways that are not yet 
apparent.17  More practically, it also raises the question whether the 
management of these networks is subject to the restraints of the 
Constitution, and if so, what limitations the First Amendment would 
place on interferences with speech carried by those networks.  After 
all, at their most basic, the networks are speech spaces, provided 
either in name or in fact by the State; they are publicly owned 
property over which citizen expression travels.  Though the 
constitutional questions would seem to logically follow from that 
premise, we seem reluctant thus far to ask them. 
Considering the Constitution’s applications to these new speech 
spaces also raises a host of subsidiary questions, all of which are, to 
this point, unresolved.  For example: 
 Are government-provided Internet networks public fora? 
 Where a private ISP is the service-provider-in-fact for a 
nominally “public” Internet access point, is the ISP a state 
actor for that purpose? 
 If so, does the First Amendment limit the ISP’s capacity for 
content-based interferences with traffic over its network, even 
if the interference is intended to prevent lawless conduct by 
users or others? 
 And if users must accede to the prospect of such interferences 
ex ante in exchange for access pursuant to the municipality’s 
and/or the network’s terms of service, are the doctrines of 
unconstitutional conditions and prior restraint implicated 
thereby? 
                                                                                                     
 16. See Crawford, The Wire Next Time, supra note 14 (“It’s clear that fiber 
networks are a natural monopoly and need to be either run directly by the 
government, or so heavily regulated that it amounts to the same thing.”). 
 17. Timothy Zick, Clouds, Cameras, and Computers: The First Amendment and 
Networked Public Places, 59 FLA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2007); see also Jack M. Balkin, Digital 
Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the 
Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2004) (noting that information 
communications technology lowers “the costs of transmission, distribution, 
appropriation, and alteration of information” because “[digital] speech is 
participatory and interactive.  People don’t merely watch (or listen to) the Internet as 
if it were television or radio.  Rather, they surf through it, they program on it, they 
publish to it, they write comments and continually add things to it.”). 
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The answers to these questions—and to forecast a bit, this Article’s 
answers to all but the first are “yes”—have important implications for 
public safety, free expression, and digital development in our urban 
spaces.  Both network managers and users need to understand these 
issues so as to shape their conduct in these twenty-first century speech 
spaces accordingly.  In the rush to embrace dynamic communications 
technologies that enable us to leave behind temporal and spatial 
limitations on speech, we risk losing sight of the Constitution’s 
commands.  If we do so, and accept these State-provided digital 
speech spaces as part of our communications infrastructure without 
thinking through the relevant First Amendment questions, we will 
sacrifice historical protection and respect for freedom of speech from 
governmental interference at the altar of the new. 
Part I of this Article provides, by way of background, a taxonomy 
of the arrangements that municipalities are using to provide free WiFi 
access to their citizens.  Part II examines whether these networks are 
public fora, and thus whether the special First Amendment rules 
imposed by the public forum doctrine apply to them.  Part III 
sketches out some rules for network administrators to apply in order 
to comply with the First Amendment.  Part IV considers the state 
action doctrine with respect to public-private networks, and concludes 
the obligations set out in Part III would apply to both the “municipal 
broadband” networks owned and operated by municipalities and, 
more controversially, to private ISPs offering free Internet access on 
behalf of local governments.  Finally, Part V contemplates the 
interaction between contract and constitutional law that is raised by 
terms of service between government Internet access providers and 
members of the public. 
I.  A TAXONOMY OF GOVERNMENT-PROVIDED DIGITAL SPEECH 
SPACES 
As noted above, broadband deployment has been a federal priority 
for many years.  More recently, however, an increasing number of 
local governments have begun their own initiatives.  Back in 2003, 
Sharon Gillett and her MIT colleagues classified these efforts on the 
local level into four categories based on the “role[] of government vis 
a vis broadband: as user, rulemaker, financier, and infrastructure 
provider.”18  The role of “infrastructure provider” included not simply 
                                                                                                     
 18. Sharon E. Gillett et al., Local Government Broadband Initiatives, 28 
TELECOMM. POL’Y 537 (2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2063217.  Gillett uses the term “user” broadly, to mean 
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the local government’s “manage[ment of the] design, funding, and 
construction” of broadband access for its citizens, but also operation 
of the network—i.e., the broadband network owner and service 
provider.19  More recently, the New America Foundation’s Open 
Technology Institute, which advocates for public broadband 
adoption, classified public broadband similarly, noting models 
“rang[ing] from a centrally coordinated government initiative to a 
shared partnership between a private entity and a local 
government.”20 
With respect to the “infrastructure provider” category, both Gillett 
et al.’s and the Open Technology Institute’s research noted a familiar 
split between those municipalities that provided direct broadband 
service and those that did not.  The majority of the former were 
smaller communities that were underserved or unserved by the 
private ISP market because of their size and/or geography; there, “the 
public sector probably provides broadband . . . because no one else 
does.” 21   Twenty years ago, supermajorities of voters in rural 
municipalities underserved by private ISPs approved bonds to finance 
public broadband networks in their communities that would be 
operated and administered by the public utilities serving their 
communities.22  By contrast, larger communities that were better 
served by commercial providers were taking less active coordination-
and-facilitation roles, such as granting infrastructure rights to private 
ISPs, providing subsidies or other in-kind preferences to commercial 
projects, or aggregating citizen demand to sweeten the business case 
for private ISPs reluctant to enter their markets—what Gillett et al. 
considered “user,” “financier,” or “rulemaker” roles.23 
The functional split between large and small towns with respect to 
broadband access, however, has decreased in salience over the past 
ten years.  Cities and counties of all sizes are now developing free 
                                                                                                     
government as “stimulator of demand,” as either “buyer, facilitator of aggregation [of 
service areas by commercial ISPs serving the municipality], or “lead user.” Id. at 8. 
 19. See id. at 5. 
 20. Open Tech. Inst. & CTC Tech. & Energy, supra note 5, at 7. 
 21. Gillett et al., supra note 18, at 36. 
 22. Steven C. Carlson, A Historical, Economic, and Legal Analysis of Municipal 
Ownership of the Information Highway, 25 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 7–8 
(1999) (citing approval rates of 88% in Alta, Iowa, and 94% in Muscatine, Iowa, the 
latter despite the incumbent cable company’s outspending of proponents by over 100 
to 1); see also John Blevins, Death of the Revolution: The Legal War on Competitive 
Broadband Technologies, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 85, 104 (2009) (“[L]iterally hundreds 
of cities  . . .  announced plans for various types of municipal broadband projects—
most of them wireless networks.”). 
 23. See Gillett et al., supra note 18, at 1. 
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WiFi networks at a rapid pace, both on their own and in collaboration 
with private operators.24  Larger cities, even those that are arguably 
well-served by the private wireless market, are providing their own 
broadband access points to the public, often by aggregating smaller 
service areas within their city limits.25  Furthermore, the municipally 
owned-and-operated network model is no longer limited to those 
communities where incentives for private sector network rollouts are 
lacking, as evidenced by, for example, San Francisco’s new free 
municipally-built and owned WiFi service along Market Street.26  
Pursuant to these efforts, as of 2011, over 125 municipalities offered 
city-wide WiFi,27 and more than 75 cities had large outdoor WiFi 
Hotspots, mostly in parks and downtown areas.28 
                                                                                                     
 24. See, e.g., Sharon E. Gillett, Municipal Wireless Broadband: Hype or 
Harbinger?, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 565–81 (2006); Josh Constine, Google Pays 
$600K to Give Free Wi-Fi to 31 San Francisco Parks, TECHCRUNCH (July 24, 2013), 
http://techcrunch.com/2013/07/24/free-wifi-san-francisco-google; Joanna Stern, New 
York City Pay Phone Booths Now Free WiFi Hotspots, ABC NEWS (July 11, 2012), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/york-city-pay-phone-booths-now-free-wifi/
story?id=16756016#.Ud7X-DvR2So. 
 25. See, e.g., Cambridge Public Internet (CPI) WiFi Access Points, 
CAMBRIDGEMA.GOV, http://www.cambridgema.gov/itd/CPI.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 
2014).  For an example of the City of Chicago’s approach, see Greg Hinz, City 
Unveils Plan For Free Wi-Fi, Wider Super-Fast Internet, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Sept. 
24, 2012, 3:30 PM), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20120924/BLOGS02/
120929936/city-unveils-plan-for-free-wi-fi-wider-super-fast-internet; Dep’t of 
Procurement Servs., City of Chi., Request for Information (RFI) for Broadband 
Infrastructure Expansion, CITY OF CHICAGO, http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/
dam/city/depts/dps/ContractAdministration/Specs/2012/Spec111304.pdf (detailing 
intended coverage areas throughout Chicago); Press Release, Mayor’s Press Office, 
Mayor Emanuel Announces Chicago Broadband Challenge (Sept. 24, 2012),  
http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/mayor/Press%20Room/Press%
20Releases/2012/September/9.24.12broadbandchallenge.pdf.  Smaller cities are 
following an aggregation strategy as well. See, e.g., About Us, KENNESAWWIFI.NET, 
http://www.kennesawwifi.net/about.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).  For a map 
showing WiFi access points in the City of Newton, North Carolina, see City of 
Newton, MERAKI, http://p13.meraki.com/network/CityofNewton (last visited Oct. 15, 
2014). 
 26. See John Coté, S.F. Rolls Out 3 Miles of Free Wi-Fi Along Market Street, S.F. 
CHRON. (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/S-F-rolls-out-3-miles-
of-free-Wi-Fi-along-Market-5067616.php#photo-3584032; San Francisco Wi-Fi, 
SFGov, http://www6.sfgov.org/index.aspx?page=246 (last visited Oct. 15, 2014). 
 27. See Olivier Sylvain, Broadband Localism, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 795, 805 (2012) 
(citing CHRISTOPHER MITCHELL, PUBLICLY OWNED BROADBAND NETWORKS: 
AVERTING THE LOOMING BROADBAND MONOPOLY (2011)). 
 28. Esme Vos, Updated List of US Cities and Counties with Large Scale WiFi 
Networks, MUNIWIRELESS.COM (June 7, 2010), http://www.muniwireless.com/2010/
06/07/updated-list-of-cities-and-counties-with-wifi/ [hereinafter Vos, Updated List]; 
Esme Vos, AT&T Launches Free WiFi in New York City Parks, 
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The business aspects of the joint venture-type arrangements for 
broadband service differ according to the nature of the agreement 
between the municipality and its commercial partner.  Cities 
sometimes entice private companies to offer these services to the 
public in exchange for their own government telecommunications 
contracts. 29   In other arrangements, private telecommunications 
providers donate hardware and/or service for publicly owned 
networks.30  Some commercial partners also build out and operate 
networks for cities in return for the right to display advertising or 
locally focused content to users. 31   The “functional boundary” 
between government and the private sector with respect to these 
networks is thus largely contract-dependent, and can differ widely 
from network to network.32   However, a common characteristic 
among these efforts is the municipality offering the service in its own 
name, but contracting the building and/or operation of the network to 
the private sector.33 
It is certainly likely that the conceptual shift from direct 
government city-wide service to mixed service models is attributable 
to legislative lobbying by ISPs, which has restricted or effectively 
barred municipalities in nearly twenty states from owning and 
operating their own broadband networks.34 
                                                                                                     
MUNIWIRELESS.COM (June 9, 2011), http://www.muniwireless.com/2011/06/09/att-
launches-free-wifi-in-new-york-city-parks/. 
 29. See Gillett et al., supra note 18, at 11 (discussing aggregated municipal units as 
“anchor tenants” for commercial telecommunications services, and the benefits 
municipalities negotiate in exchange for such arrangements). 
 30. This is also true with respect to publicly owned networks. See, e.g., Coté, 
supra note 26. 
 31. See, e.g., Microsoft and MetroFi Team Up on Free Wireless Internet in 
Portland, Ore., MICROSOFT, (Nov. 14, 2006), https://www.microsoft.com/en-
us/news/press/2006/nov06/11-14metrofipr.aspx.  However, the private ISP operating 
the ad-supported free wireless network on behalf of Portland went out of business. 
See Jacqueline Emigh, In Portland, Oregon, Another City-wide Wi-Fi Network Bites 
the Dust, BETANEWS, http://betanews.com/2008/02/22/in-portland-oregon-another-
city-wide-wi-fi-network-bites-the-dust/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2014). 
 32. Gillett et al., supra note 18, at 18. 
 33. For a more in-depth discussion of these arrangements, see infra notes 67–75 
and accompanying text. 
 34.  See, e.g., François Bar & Namkee Park, Municipal Wi-Fi Networks: The 
Goals, Practices, and Policy Implications of the U.S. Case, 61 COMM. & STRATEGIES 
107, 107 (2006) (detailing the growing number of municipal WiFi networks in the 
U.S. and abroad), noted in Michael A. Janson & Christopher S. Yoo, The Wires Go 
To War: The U.S. Experiment with Government Ownership of the Telephone 
System During World War I, 91 TEX. L. REV. 983, 987 n.18 (2013); Gillett et al., supra 
note 18, at 19–20; Susan Crawford, U.S. Internet Users Pay More for Slower Service, 
BLOOMBERGVIEW (Dec. 27, 2012, 6:30 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/
articles/2012-12-27/u-s-internet-users-pay-more-for-slower-service (detailing Time 
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However, in both types of cases—government-as-infrastructure-
provider, where a municipality acts as network operator, and 
government-as-joint-venture-partner, where a commercial operator 
manages the network on the government’s behalf—citizens will use 
these networks to transmit First Amendment-protected speech.  The 
next three Parts of this Article set out some of the constitutional 
issues raised by this fact and suggest possible ways to resolve them. 
II.  FORUM DOCTRINE: NOT THE ANSWER 
With respect to whether the First Amendment should apply to 
municipal Internet networks, public forum doctrine would seem to 
offer one path.  However, as I have argued previously, it seems clear 
(at least to me) that State-provided Internet networks, offered either 
directly by a municipal utility or in partnership with a private ISP as 
the service-provider-in-fact, are neither traditional nor designated 
public fora.35  Forum doctrine comes from the theory of easement: 
when the public openly uses public space for communication, it earns 
a type of speech easement by prescription, which remains available 
for subsequent members of the public to use to communicate.36  The 
State, as owner of the servient estate, cannot then eject speakers from 
that space for content-based reasons.37  The presence or absence of 
historical use of the space or similar spaces for speech, as manifested 
in traditional public forum doctrine, is thus dispositive.  Where the 
claim is that the government has designated a space for speech, intent 
to grant the public general access to the space for that purpose must 
be present, or no forum will be found.38 
                                                                                                     
Warner’s successful efforts in the North Carolina legislature to pass a law banning 
municipal broadband service in that state, and noting that “[e]ighteen other states 
have laws that make it extremely difficult or impossible for cities to provide this 
service to their residents.”); Jesse Drucker, Wireless Warrior, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 
2006, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB113943275592368690.html 
(“[L]egislatures in at least 14 states and Congress proposed legislation to restrict 
municipal wireless efforts.”).  By one account, at least thirty-five states have 
considered such legislation. See Blevins, supra note 22, at 110 n.127 (citing FED. 
COMMC’NS COMM’N, BRINGING BROADBAND TO RURAL AMERICA: REPORT ON A 
RURAL BROADBAND STRATEGY 53 n.308 (2009)). 
 35. See generally Enrique Armijo, Kill Switches, Forum Doctrine, and the First 
Amendment’s Digital Future, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 411 (2014). 
 36. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 
1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 13 (1965). 
 37. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educator’s Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
 38. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998) (citing 
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)). 
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With these rules (admittedly overgeneralized here) in place, it is 
unlikely that a government-provided Internet network would be 
deemed a public forum by a reviewing court.  The modernity of a 
space nearly always eliminates it from traditional public forum 
eligibility.  Additionally, so far as designated public forum status, 
cases like United States v. American Library Association,39 United 
States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Associations,40 and Denver 
Area Educational Television Consortium v. FCC 41  treat State-
provided speech spaces such as Internet public library terminals, the 
Postal Service, and public access television channels as access 
information points rather than networked exchanges.  These findings 
cut against concluding the spaces at issue in those cases were 
designated public fora since, as discussed, a public forum needs a 
speech easement, and a speech easement by designation must be 
intended to serve both speakers and listeners.42 
However, even if a municipal WiFi network cannot be a traditional 
or designated public forum, even nonpublic fora—property owned or 
controlled by the government, but “not by tradition or designation a 
                                                                                                     
 39. See 539 U.S. 194, 206 (2003). 
 40. See 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981). 
 41. See 518 U.S. 727, 740 (1996) (Breyer, J., plurality opinion); id. at 768 (Stevens, 
J., concurring) (“I am convinced that it would be unwise to take a categorical 
approach to the resolution of novel First Amendment questions arising in an industry 
as dynamic as this.”); id. at 777 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[N]ot every nuance of our 
old standards will necessarily do for the new technology, and . . . a proper choice 
among existing doctrinal categories is not obvious.”); id. at 779–80 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“[W]e should not yet undertake fully to adapt our First Amendment 
doctrine to the new context we confront here.”); id. at 829–30 (Thomas, J., concurring 
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by Scalia, J., and Rehnquist, 
C.J.) (“We have expressly stated that neither government ownership nor government 
control will guarantee public access to property . . . . [U]nlike a park picketer, an 
access programmer cannot transmit its own message. Instead, it is the operator who 
must transmit, or ‘speak,’ the access programmer’s message.”). 
 42. As the Court said in American Library Association, providing Internet access 
at library terminals no more designates a public forum than “collect[ing] books” 
designates a “public forum for the authors of [the] books to speak.” 539 U.S. at 206.  
Rather, the terminals were intended “to facilitate research, learning, and recreational 
pursuits” for patrons. Id. at 195.  There was no intent, in other words, to foster the 
speech of website developers or open a communications channel between those 
developers and library patrons. See generally id.  Similarly, in Greenburgh, the Court 
stated that its cases did not support the “sweeping proposition” that “simply because 
an instrumentality is used for the communication of ideas and information, it thereby 
becomes a public forum.” 453 U.S. at 130 n.6. 
  As I have previously noted, Denver Area Consortium convincingly 
demonstrates that the Court’s refusal to find new speech spaces to be traditional 
public fora has bled into its designated public forum analysis, which has completed 
the “erosion of forum doctrine’s categorical approach to speech rights on public 
property.” Armijo, supra note 35, at 440. 
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forum for public communication”43—impose some restrictions on the 
State’s ability to interfere with speech.  In particular, the State may 
exclude speakers from nonpublic fora so long as the exclusion is 
reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.44  Accordingly, a municipality may 
restrict speech or speakers from its network, but if that network is 
deemed a nonpublic forum, the speaker may not be excluded if, for 
example, the speaker criticizes the municipality or its officials. 
Likewise, any content-based parameters that the municipality 
imposes on the network will be judged by a reasonableness 
standard;45 for example, it would likely be found reasonable for a city 
to block access to constitutionally protected but offensive content in a 
public space such as a park or downtown area, out of concerns that 
unsupervised children might be able to view the material.46  Some 
content-based proscriptions on network use, on the other hand, such 
as a ban on using the network to organize a protest or nonviolent 
public disruption, might be found unreasonable.  Nonpublic forum 
analysis, in other words, applies only to the State’s worst offenses 
against free expression. 
The current easement-derived understanding of forum doctrine 
compels the conclusion that municipally provided Internet networks 
are not public fora.  However, other, more expansive interpretations 
of the doctrine might prove more protective.  For example, some 
scholars have argued that the historical public trust doctrine is a 
better way to resolve speech-in-public-space questions than the forum 
doctrine.47  Public trust doctrine derives from Roman and English 
law, which stripped the King’s power to prohibit common public uses 
of rivers, seas, and shores, in effect making sovereign ownership of 
those lands in trust for the public’s benefit, rather than in fee.48  
Extrapolated to free speech debates, a public trust doctrine approach 
to speech on public property would call for sublimating State-owned 
                                                                                                     
 43. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educator’s Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 1991 (2011). 
 46. Cf. id. at 2000–02 (citing cases where public order, decorum, and civility-
related rules validly infringed on citizen’s otherwise protected speech in the context 
of city council or other governmental meetings).  To use an earthbound analogy, the 
First Amendment does not foreclose a “no nude dancing on the playground” rule. 
See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978) (holding that the government 
has important interest in protecting children from indecent material). 
 47. See generally Marie A. Failinger, New Wine, New Bottles: Private Property 
Metaphors and Public Forum Speech, 71 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 217, 312–13 (1997). 
 48. See Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of 
Cultural Property in the United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559, 647 (1995) (citing 
Failinger, supra note 47, at n.423 and accompanying text). 
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management of its property to citizens’ choices with respect to the 
content of their communication because the State’s “ownership” of 
the property is fiduciary in nature and subject to the interest of its 
trustees—here, the public. 
Though public trust doctrine perhaps sounds like a more noble 
methodology to apply to First Amendment questions, it offers much 
less in the way of actually answering them in the particular context of 
network management and ex ante interferences with digital speech.  
For example, would the State be barred from momentarily blocking 
access to Facebook in a particular public space if the site were being 
used to coordinate or otherwise incite imminent collective action in 
that space that might be criminal in nature?  On the one hand, the 
State is clearly interfering with its trustees’ right to free speech; on the 
other hand, other trustees, who would otherwise suffer from the 
conduct the speech was in the process of facilitating, would be mighty 
grateful.  When members of the public have opposing interests, the 
public trust model fails to tell us which trustee wins out.  
Alternatively, one could argue that as a matter of both First 
Amendment law and democracy-promoting information policy, the 
State, as owner of property in public trust, is obliged to establish what 
Jack Balkin calls an “infrastructure of free expression” that bars 
content-based interferences with citizen speech using public space, or 
at the very least those that are applied to speech ex ante.49  In the end, 
however, and in either case, the public trust approach to forum 
questions seems to assess the costs and benefits associated with the 
State’s speech interferences—a task our existing levels of First 
Amendment scrutiny already perform. 
Similarly, forum doctrine is often read to permit the government to 
bar those uses of its property that are incompatible with the 
property’s intended use.50  With respect to speech carried over a 
municipal broadband network, there is no prima facie incompatibility.  
The State establishes, develops, and designs the network to carry 
data, and the expressive activity for which the network is intended to 
be used is indistinguishable as a technical matter from those purposes.  
                                                                                                     
 49. Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. 2296, 2301 (2014); Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital 
Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427, 432 (2009). 
 50. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 819–20 
(1985); see also Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 698 
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If the objective, physical characteristics of the 
property at issue and the actual public access and uses that have been permitted by 
the government indicate that expressive activity would be appropriate and 
compatible with those uses, the property is a public forum.”). 
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One wonders, however, whether a court reviewing a municipality’s 
content-related restrictions on the use of its network could be trusted 
to operate at such a speech-favorable level of abstraction. 
For example, assume a network’s enabling legislation states that 
the municipality intended to offer Internet access to, per the above, 
provide “24/7 access to everything from education materials to kids, 
to information about Harlem’s rich history and attractions, to 
everyday needs like paying bills [and] checking library hours.”51  
Would a policy that barred use of the network to promulgate the 
“depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of 
citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion” be “incompatible” with 
the municipality’s intended use?52  Incompatibility analysis in forum 
doctrine cases has often focused on physical incompatibility between 
the intended expression and the government’s intended use of the 
public property—e.g., in-person solicitation of travelers is 
incompatible with the purpose of an airport terminal, which is to 
ensure those travelers can promptly reach their flight gates.53  The 
reason for that limitation, of course, is that those cases dealt with 
physical spaces.  In the virtual context, a government could easily 
make the argument that some expression is incompatible with the 
government’s intended purposes for the property because of the 
expression’s content.  As noted, if the property is deemed to be a 
nonpublic forum, a reviewing court would uphold reasonable content-
based proscriptions on expressive uses of the property. 
Despite all that, even though courts might find that a State-
provided communications network is a public forum under either the 
easement approach or another, nominally speech-friendlier approach, 
there is a significant risk that the doctrine would be applied only to 
the physical space from which the speaker “speaks,” rather than to 
the networked space that the speaker and listener share.54  Since we 
                                                                                                     
 51. Eng, supra note 4. 
 52. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 251 (1952). 
 53. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 685. 
 54. For an example of this analysis, consider Bay Area Rapid Transit’s responses 
to claims that it violated the First Amendment when it turned off its cellphone service 
repeaters when it received word of a protest within its train stations in August 2011.  
BART claimed that there was no First Amendment violation because its train 
platforms were established to facilitate transportation rather than speech, and thus 
were neither traditional nor designated public fora. See Bob Franklin, A Letter from 
BART to Our Customers, BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT (Aug. 20, 2011), 
http://www.bart.gov/news/articles/2011/news20110820 (“BART has designated the 
areas of its stations that are accessible to the general public without the purchase of 
tickets as unpaid areas that are open for expressive activity upon issuance of a permit 
subject to BART’s rules.”). 
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are not necessarily dealing with shared physical spaces in the context 
of online speech, forum doctrine thus undervalues, if not ignores, the 
listener’s rights to receive information—a result that does violence to 
the freedom-of-assembly-protective principles underlying forum 
doctrine in the first place.55  If forum doctrine is anything, it is path-
dependent.  Hence, with forum doctrine off the table, we are left with 
the plain old First Amendment and the question of whether it applies 
to these spaces on its own terms. 
III.  FIRST AMENDMENT RULES FOR GOVERNMENT-PROVIDED 
INTERNET ACCESS 
A. The First Amendment Interest in Nondiscriminatory Speech 
Carriage 
If the State carries the messages of speakers, then case law 
confirms that the First Amendment compels nondiscriminatory 
treatment of those messages.  For example, in Lamont v. Postmaster 
General, a federal statute empowered the Postmaster General to 
confiscate foreign-originated mail that he deemed to be “Communist 
propaganda,” of which a recipient could request delivery, upon 
receiving notice of confiscation. 56   The Lamont petitioner, a 
pamphleteer who received notice of the Post Office’s confiscation of 
his copy of the Peking Review, sought to enjoin the statute’s 
enforcement, arguing that it violated his First Amendment right to 
receive information.  The Supreme Court unanimously agreed, noting 
that “[t]he United States may give up the post office when it sees fit, 
but while it carries it on the use of the mails is almost as much a part 
of free speech as the right to use our tongues . . . .”57 
Independent of forum doctrine, the First Amendment mandates 
that government not discriminate in its carriage of user speech.  This 
conclusion is supported by the doctrine of common carriage, which 
requires the government to provide access to its services without 
making “individualized decisions in particular cases [concerning] 
                                                                                                     
 55. As the Court said in its primary case adopting the doctrine, the public forum is 
intended to preserve associational spaces for “assembly, communicating thoughts 
between citizens, and discussing public questions.”  Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 
307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939); see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 
YALE L.J. 978, 1015–16 (2011) (“[I]t is assembly, not the actions of a street-corner 
speaker, that is at the heart of the public forum doctrine.”). 
 56. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen. of U.S., 381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
 57. United States ex rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 
U.S. 407, 437 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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whether and on what terms to serve” members of the public.58  With 
respect to the carriage of speech, the federal government has long 
since decided that freedom from government interference is essential 
to the development of the mail system.59  The same rule necessarily 
applies to speech transmitted digitally.  As a service open to all, a 
public broadband network must not discriminate among users or 
constitutionally protected content carried by that network. 
Despite this rule, which amounts to a First Amendment-informed 
network management principle, a network operator must have the 
technical ability to protect the network and its users against attacks.  
Viruses and malware interfere with other users’ speech over the 
network, granting what I have previously called a “hacker’s veto” 
over lawful speech-related uses. 60   Thus, despite the First 
Amendment’s application to these speech spaces, the State’s network 
operator should be free to make content-neutral technical 
management decisions that have the effect of keeping a network safe 
and operable.  Such decisions would likely be permissible as 
time/place/manner restrictions under ordinary First Amendment 
doctrine. 
B. A Workable Nondiscrimination Principle for Digital Speech 
Carriage 
If the First Amendment is a network management principle for 
municipally provided Internet networks, the question remains how 
that principle should be put into effect.  This Subpart outlines these 
obligations in greater detail. 
Thanks to technological advances in deep packet inspection, there 
is no doubt that ISPs have the ability to examine, “on a ‘real time’ 
basis, both routing information . . . [and] the actual content contained 
in . . . every packet that traverses the ISP’s network.”61  The issue then 
                                                                                                     
 58. Jonathan S. Marashlian et al., The Mis-Administration and Misadventures of 
the Universal Service Fund: A Study in the Importance of the Administrative 
Procedure Act to Government Agency Rulemaking, 19 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 343, 
368 (2011). 
 59. This principle was manifested in the Postal Clause’s granting of a public 
monopoly in postal service to the Congress, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2, which 
“put the federal government in the common carrier business.” ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, 
TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 17 (1983); see also Armijo, supra note 35, at 443–45. 
 60. Armijo, supra note 35, at 446. 
 61. See Rob Frieden, Invoking and Avoiding the First Amendment: How Internet 
Service Providers Leverage Their Status as Both Content Creators and Neutral 
Conduits, 12 JOURN. OF CONSTITUTIONAL L. 1279, 1311-12 (2010).  “Deep packet 
inspection” technology permits network providers to identify both the applications 
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turns to ensuring that the State exercises this capacity in a speech-
protective way.  As I have argued previously, to use a framework 
proposed by Thomas Nachbar and propounded in the debates around 
network neutrality, State-run communications networks must be: (1) 
user-neutral—i.e., that the network should provide continuous service 
to any user seeking to connect to it, to the extent such service is 
technologically feasible; and (2) use-neutral—i.e., that the network 
should not bar devices or applications of any type from being used on 
it, except for those that would threaten the stability of the network.62  
Because the network is owned and/or operated by the State, the user- 
and use-based discrimination rules should track the rule, which 
currently governs in physical public space: punishing users for 
accessing or disseminating illegal or otherwise unprotected speech 
over the State’s network must occur ex post.  In other words, the 
preemptive denials of access that would, in a non-digital context, be 
treated as prior restraints, namely, content-based disconnection or 
denials of carriage, should be presumptively barred. 
IV.  PUBLIC-PRIVATE INTERNET ACCESS PARTNERSHIPS AND 
STATE ACTION 
If State-run Internet networks may not discriminate on the basis of 
content, there remains the question of which networks, other than 
those provided directly by a municipality pursuant to the utility 
model, should be considered “State-run.”63  In the case of public-
private partnerships, the answer is clear: where the municipality and 
its service-provider-in-fact enjoy an “overlapping identity” with 
respect to the service, and the municipality undertakes to provide 
Internet access pursuant to its residents’ general welfare, then the 
private partner is a state actor bound by the First Amendment to the 
same degree as the State would be had it provided the service itself.64 
                                                                                                     
used on their networks and the content that users transmit often in real time, using 
keyword searches and other monitoring techniques.  Using DPI, the network 
operator has the ability to decide which applications or content will be transmitted 
and at what speed. See id.; see generally M. Chris Riley & Ben Scott, Deep Packet 
Inspection: The End of the Internet as We Know It?, FREE PRESS, (Mar. 18, 2009), 
http://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/fp-legacy/Deep_Packet_Inspection_The_
End_of_the_Internet_As_We_Know_It.pdf. 
 62. Thomas B. Nachbar, The Public Network, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 67, 
127–28 (2008); see also Armijo, supra note 35, at 462. 
 63. Cf. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11–15 (1978) 
(holding that a municipal utility is a state actor and thus obliged to comply with Due 
Process Clause when terminating a citizen’s service). 
 64. See Lansing v. City of Memphis, 202 F.3d 821, 829 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that 
the private actor’s choice is “deemed to be that of the state” when the state 
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The “entwinement” approach to state action questions asks 
whether the contacts between the State and its private partner, in 
providing a service to the public, become so extensive that, as a 
matter of fairness, the latter’s conduct is fairly attributable to the 
former.65  With respect to public-private partnerships for high-speed 
Internet service, municipalities pass ordinances that enable their 
administrative subsidiaries to enter into contractual arrangements 
with private ISPs to provide Internet access, delivered in public 
spaces to any willing users at no cost. 66   They do so for 
quintessentially public reasons.  As noted above, municipalities 
provide high-speed Internet access for the general public welfare, 
meeting social needs such as economic development,67 public safety,68 
education,69 and reducing the cost citizens would otherwise pay to 
purely private carriers for broadband access.70  Those cities enter 
                                                                                                     
“exercise[s] such coercive power or provide[s] . . . significant encouragement, either 
overt or covert”). 
 65. See id. 
 66. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966). 
 67. See, e.g., Chattanooga, Tenn., Res. No. 23446 (2002) (enacted), available at 
http://www.ilsr.org/rule/2515-2/ (finding that “local businesses consider the level of 
technological advancement of the City and the surrounding area when electing to 
remain” and that provision of “Internet services” will be “a significant, integral and 
necessary step in the City’s economic development efforts”); San Jose, Cal., Request 
for Proposals # 13-14-12: Maintenance and Expansion of Downtown Wireless 
Network Utilizing Ruckus Wireless Equipment (Feb. 26, 2014), at 12 (wireless 
Internet service would “help drive economic impact in our community”) (on file with 
author); Agreement for the Purchase and Installation of a Downtown WiFi Mesh 
Network By and Between the City of San Jose and SmartWave Technologies LLC 
(July 3, 2012), “Project Objectives,” at 13 (service would “stimulate economic 
development” and help residents and visitors “to learn about downtown”); id. at 15, 
“City Responsibilities” (obligating city to promote “the use and value of wireless 
communications to enhance the Silicon Valley life”) (on file with author). 
 68. See Matt Flegenheimer, Wi-Fi and Cellphone Service on Subway Trains? 
M.T.A. Leader Says It May Happen, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/18/nyregion/mta-plans-wi-fi-and-phone-service-on-
subway-trains.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&smid=tw-nytimes&_r=0 (stating that the 
M.T.A. frames expansion of wireless and cellphone service on trains “as a safety 
issue”). 
 69. See, e.g., S. 78, 2011 Gen. Assembly, ¶ 16 (Vt. 2011), available at 
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2012/Acts/ACT053.pdf. 
 70. See, e.g., AMMON, IDAHO,  CITY CODE § 8-9-1 (2011), 
http://www.ci.ammon.id.us/pdf/citycode/07012013AmmonCityCode.pdf (stating that 
the purpose of the law is to establish a City owned fiber optic system in order to, inter 
alia, “protect the cost of broadband services by eliminating anti-competitive pricing 
schemes or monopolistic practices which contribute to higher costs for broadband 
services.”).  With respect to this note and the one immediately preceding, it bears 
emphasis that where an action is “specifically authorized by an official exercising 
statutory authority,” activity undertaken pursuant to that authority is “substantively a 
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partnerships with private entities to meet the same ends.71  Public-
private contracts for service delivery are of course not enough by 
themselves to render the private counterparty a state actor. 72  
However, when the State receives benefits from the contract that 
extend well beyond the service delivery itself, then the private party’s 
actions should be attributable to the State.  And when those 
concomitant benefits are public in nature, the conclusion that the 
private party is a state actor should be readily reached. 
As Justice Harlan’s dissent in the Civil Rights Cases notes, where a 
“corporation or individual wield[s] power under state authority for 
the public benefit or the public convenience,” the Constitution should 
apply to the corporation or individual’s acts.73  The arrangements at 
issue here provide significant public benefits.  For example, in 
soliciting partners for the Wireless Corridor Challenge, a public 
access WiFi project intended to provide connectivity to several of the 
City’s commercial districts, the New York City Economic 
Development Corporation stated that “in recent years WiFi . . . has 
become the newest urban requirement.”  “Better connectivity in the 
City’s commercial districts,” the EDC’s model contract for the service 
continued, “will be critical to the City’s businesses, residents and 
visitors, and to the City’s ability to drive growth and innovation and 
to maintain its competitiveness.”74  An ambitious project that plans to 
place free WiFi Hotspots in New York City’s 7000 public payphones 
will “help support job seekers, freelancers, residents in need of 
affordable broadband services, small businesses, the local tech 
                                                                                                     
state action.” Daphne Barak-Erez, State Action Doctrine for an Age of Privatization, 
45 SYR. L. REV. 1169, 1173 (1995). 
 71. See, e.g., City of New York Department of Information Technology & 
Telecommunications, Request for Proposals for a Franchise to Install, Operate, and 
Maintain Public Communications Structures in the Boroughs of the Bronx, Brooklyn, 
Manhattan, Queens, and Staten Island, PIN # 8582014 FRANCH 3 (April 30, 2014), 
at 3–6, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doitt/downloads/pdf/DoITT-Public-Communication-
Structure-RFP-4-30-14.pdf [hereinafter Reimagining Payphones Project RFP]. 
 72. See Dickerson v. Cal. Waste Solutions, No. C 08-03773 WHA, 2009 WL 
2913452 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2009). 
 73. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 59 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 74. New York City Economic Development Corporation Wireless Corridor 
Challenge Consultant Contract No. 55530001: Flatiron/23rd St. Partnership District 
Management Ass’n, App’x. B-2, “Goals and Objectives” (on file with author).  As 
part of these agreements, the Corporation’s counterparties were required to “identify 
populations” in the service area “that will benefit from the wireless network,” and to 
“create projections to estimate the impact of the wireless network on commercial 
activity” in that area, “including the ability to attract new businesses to the 
neighborhood, connect commercial corridors, and increase foot traffic/marketing of 
[the served] business district.” Id., App’x. B-3-4, “Wireless Network Neighborhood 
Plan” (on file with author). 
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industry and visitors.”75  Similarly, the agreement establishing the 
aforementioned Harlem WiFi project, between New York City’s 
Department of Information Technology and Telecommunication, 
Sky-Packets, and the Mayor’s Fund to Advance New York City, notes 
that the Fund’s goals are to “encourag[e], promot[e], and advanc[e] 
activities and programs to assist the City of New York in the 
implementation of civic improvements and social welfare programs 
and otherwise cooperating with the City in promoting the general 
welfare of the City’s residents.”76  Social and general welfare are 
bedrock public purposes, even if New York City is meeting them with 
the assistance of a private ISP.77  Public benefits and public burdens 
go hand-in-hand. 
Counterarguments to this conclusion, however, are readily 
available.  Per some cases applying the state action doctrine’s “public 
function” inquiry, a private entity is not a state actor if the service it 
provides is not one that has been “traditionally exclusively reserved 
to the State.”78  Providing high-speed Internet is not an exclusive 
“traditional state function” and the example might be distinguishable 
on that basis.79  If citizen access to high-speed Internet service is not a 
function that has been “traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the 
State”80 in the same way as providing roads, parks, lights, water, or 
gas may be—and there is little doubt that it has not, given the 
longstanding dominance of private ISPs in our communications 
infrastructure—then a company providing it on the State’s behalf 
might not be considered a state actor.81  The traditional public 
function analysis, in particular the Rehnquist Court’s emphasis on the 
exclusively sovereign nature of the function in question, carries real 
force as a limiting principle in state action questions. 
                                                                                                     
 75. Reimagining Payphones Project RFP, supra note 71, at 3–6, 18. 
 76. Harlem WiFi Agreement, p. 1 (Nov. 4, 2013) (alteration in original) (on file 
with author). 
 77. See Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 374 (1995) (holding 
that Amtrak is a state actor because it was created by statute and “explicitly for the 
furtherance of federal governmental goals”). 
 78. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974) (emphasis added). 
 79. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (finding the operation of 
“privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes, and railroads” to be “essentially a public 
function”); cf. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350 n.7. (finding “companies engaged in providing 
gas, power, or water; all common carriers, pipeline companies, telephone and 
telegraph companies, sewage collection and disposal companies; and corporations 
affiliated with any company engaging in such activities” are not engaged in 
traditionally exclusive State functions). 
 80. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982). 
 81. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352. 
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Additionally, ever since its conceptual birth in the Court’s Civil 
Rights Cases in 1883,82 the state action doctrine has historically been 
more concerned with violations of the Fourteenth Amendment than 
of the First.  Paradigmatic state action cases involve instances where 
the State has sought to preserve discriminatory practices and evade 
the Constitution’s proscriptions of the same by offloading state 
functions to private actors.  For example, in Evans v. Newton, a city 
had transferred operational control over a park to private trustees in 
order to avoid desegregating it, which would have been contrary to 
the “for whites only” terms of the park’s establishing testamentary 
trust.83  Despite the trustee’s control over the space, however, the 
Supreme Court found that the private trustees were state actors 
because the park served a primarily public purpose. 84   Though 
Newton supports the conclusion argued here, as Rodney Smolla and 
Melville Nimmer have pointed out, the doctrine is viewed more 
expansively in the Equal Protection context than in the speech 
context.85  No one would doubt, for example, that if Sky-Packets were 
to refuse to serve a particular area of Harlem as part of the Harlem 
WiFi project on the ground that the area was overwhelmingly made 
up of long-time African American residents, the Equal Protection 
Clause would be implicated, even though the City was not the service-
provider-in-fact.  It may not follow, however, that the First 
Amendment would apply with similar force to an analogous set of 
facts.86 
Despite these counterarguments, it certainly seems true that the 
First Amendment should reach a private party that is transmitting 
speech on the State’s behalf, particularly when the State is holding 
itself out as transmitter-in-fact to the public.  Indeed, the state action 
doctrine’s “public function” test was first adopted in a First 
Amendment case—Marsh v. Alabama.87  To be sure, Marsh itself has 
been construed narrowly.88  However, its core holding—that when a 
private party stands in the shoes of the State, the Constitution applies 
                                                                                                     
 82. See G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine: 
The Search for Governmental Responsibility, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 333, 338–39 (1997). 
 83. See 382 U.S. 296, 297 (1966). 
 84. Id. at 301. 
 85. 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 16:26 
(2009). 
 86. But see Jackson, 419 U.S. at 373–74 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (doubting that 
“different standards [can] apply to state-action analysis when different constitutional 
claims are presented”). 
 87. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
 88. See, e.g., Cable Invs., Inc. v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151, 162 (3d Cir. 1989). 
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to the party’s conduct—remains salient.  More recent decisions have 
turned away from an “all or nothing question of governmental 
exclusivity” to a more nuanced public function analysis, as well as a 
willingness to consider the combined weight of public function along 
with other state action factors like entwinement.89  If state action 
jurisprudence continues in this direction, the mere fact that other 
private ISPs exist would not bar such an ISP from being found a state 
actor when it is providing citizens Internet access on a municipality’s 
behalf. 
Ultimately, the state action rule proposed by this Article is simple: 
if a municipality claims to provide high-speed Internet service to 
members of the public in its own name, and the municipality has 
pointed to important public purposes in delegating authority to the 
service-provider-in-fact, then the Constitution’s demands should 
apply to that service.  This is so not merely because a member of the 
public would reasonably observe the service to have been provided by 
the municipality, though that is certainly the case.  The municipality 
in question, whether through its own service or by partnering with a 
private ISP to provide service, enjoys the public interest-related 
remunerations, as well as the political benefits, associated with high-
speed Internet connectivity for its constituents.  New York City and 
its political leaders can tout the benefits of connecting Harlem to 
WiFi, but along with those benefits should come the burdens of acting 
consistently with the First Amendment when managing the 
network—even if a private joint venture partner does the day-to-day 
managing.  Without entwinement between a private ISP and the 
State, the Internet access provided by these networks would not exist 
at all. 
V.  TERMS OF SERVICE AS SPEECH RULES AND THE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE 
Like other ISPs, municipalities or their joint venture partners 
regularly require that users assent to contractual terms-of-use-based 
obligations as a precondition to network access.  By defining what 
speech can and cannot be transmitted over the network, and by 
setting out the grounds by which the State can refuse a user access, 
these terms define the contours of users’ First Amendment rights.  
                                                                                                     
 89. Buchanan, supra note 82, at 389–90 (discussing Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) and Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992)’s 
implicit rejection of an exclusivity requirement under public function analysis); Id. at 
422–23 (discussing a “returning willingness by the Court to consider the combined 
weight of all state contact factors under state nexus analysis.”). 
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For example, the city of Miami’s terms of use for its Miami Beach 
WiFi network requires users to waive any claims against the City 
based on service disruptions: 
[Y]our access to the Service is completely at the discretion of the 
City, and your access to the Service may be blocked, suspended, or 
terminated at any time, at the sole discretion of the City, without 
cause or for any reason including, but not limited to, any violation of 
this Agreement, actions that may lead to liability for the City, 
disruption of access to other Users or networks, and violation of 
applicable laws or regulations . . . . Service is subject to 
unavailability, including emergencies, third party service failures, 
transmission, equipment or network problems or limitations, 
interference, lack of signal strength, and maintenance and repair, 
and may be interrupted, refused, limited, or curtailed at any time.90 
Some terms of service for government-provided Internet access bar 
outright certain constitutionally protected expression.  For example, 
the “Acceptable Use Policy” for the municipal utility-provided 
Chattanooga fiber optic network bars users from using the network to 
“transmit, distribute, or store material . . . that is,” in addition to 
illegal, “obscene, threatening, abusive or hateful,” or that offends 
“the privacy, publicity or other personal rights of others.”91  Nor may 
users of the network “post messages” on third-party blogs “that are 
excessive and/or intended to annoy or harass others”—“regardless of 
[the] policies” of the blogs on which the users post.92  As in the Miami 
terms of service, the utility operating of the Chattanooga network 
also “reserves the right to reject or remove any material residing on 
or transmitted to or through” the network that violates the 
Acceptable Use Policy.93  The Terms and Conditions for GOWEX, 
the private partner offering Internet access as part of the 
aforementioned New York City Wireless Corridor Challenge, “bars 
                                                                                                     
 90. City of Miami Beach: WiFi Miami Beach—Network Terms and Conditions, 
MIAMI BEACH, http://web.miamibeachfl.gov/wifi/scroll.aspx?id=53292 (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2014) (emphasis added); see also City of Raleigh, North Carolina, 
Downtown Raleigh Free WiFi Access Terms and Conditions (on file with author) 
(“Under no circumstances shall the City, its officers, employees, or agents be liable 
for any direct, indirect, incidental, special, punitive or consequential or other 
damages that arise or result in any way from use of, or inability to use, the service to 
or access to the Internet or any part thereof, or user’s reliance on, or use of, 
information, services, or merchandise provided on or deletion of files, errors, defects, 
delays in operation, or transmission, or any defect in or failure of performance.”). 
 91. See Acceptable Use Policy, ELECTRIC POWER BOARD CHATTANOOGA FIBER 
OPTICS, https://epbfi.com/support/legal/acceptable-use-policy/ (last visited Oct. 15, 
2014). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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the transmission of data . . . via Hotspots managed by 
GOWEX . . . whose content is threatening, derogatory, obscene, 
pornographic, or the transmission of any other type of material which 
constitutes or incites a conduct which may be considered a criminal 
offense, is prohibited.”94  GOWEX also “reserves the right to prevent 
or block access to any user” who violates the content policy.95 
This Article has argued that speech carried over a public network, 
operated as either a municipally owned utility or via a partnership 
with a private ISP, is protected by the First Amendment, and a 
content-based interference with speech that is intended to be carried 
over such a network is a prior restraint.  First Amendment doctrine 
also makes clear that outright bans on protected speech—even 
indecent speech, let alone “excessive,” “derogatory,” “abusive,” or 
“hateful” speech—are never narrowly tailored enough to survive 
strict scrutiny.96  If those three premises are correct, it seems clear 
that terms of service containing use proscriptions and waivers of the 
type used by Miami, Chattanooga, and perhaps scores of other 
municipalities, are impermissibly restricting carriage of a willing 
user’s right to transmit protected speech over their networks. 
As a general matter, “[g]ranting waivers to favored speakers 
(or . . . denying them to disfavored speakers) would of course be 
unconstitutional.”97  Similarly, a State’s conditioning the receipt of a 
benefit on accepting a prior restraint on speech also offends the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.  As Cass Sunstein has described 
the doctrine, “government may not coerce people into relinquishing 
constitutional rights through regulation, spending, and licensing, any 
more than it may do so through criminal sanctions.”98  In these cases, 
the relinquishment is of the First Amendment-derived right to 
nondiscriminatory government treatment of speech, and the coercion 
is the pre-requirement of waiver of the right to sue in exchange for 
                                                                                                     
 94. GOWEX Terms and Conditions for the New York City Wireless Corridor 
Challenge (on file with author). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Sable Commc’ns. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126–28 (1989) (upholding 
ban on obscene telephone messages, but finding ban on indecent messages not 
narrowly tailored because indecent material generally receives full First Amendment 
protection). 
 97. Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 325 (2002). 
 98. See Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an 
Anachronism (With Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 
B.U. L. REV. 593, 601 (1990); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) 
(statement of the doctrine); Frost Trucking Co. et al., v. R.R. Comm’n of State of 
Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926) (statement of the doctrine); Armijo, supra note 35, at 
466. 
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access to the network over which that speech will take place.  
Moreover, governments conditioning Internet access on the waiver of 
First Amendment rights cannot be heard to argue that prospective 
speakers can simply exercise those rights using the networks of 
private ISPs; the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is unconcerned 
with “alternative settings” for the speech of the parties the 
government seeks to coerce.99 
Of course, the notion that one can waive at least some First 
Amendment rights in exchange for a government benefit without 
offending the Constitution is familiar in one particular context: public 
employment.  There, the Supreme Court seems to have little trouble 
finding that the acceptance of the benefit validates the waiver.  For 
example, in Snepp v. United States,100 the Supreme Court upheld the 
use of secrecy agreements to regulate the speech of CIA employees.  
However, in that case the government did not seek waiver solely out 
of an interest in censorship; rather, the CIA had particular national 
security-related interests in preserving secrets to which current and 
former CIA employees had access.101  By contrast, with respect to 
government-provided broadband, there is no non-censorship-related 
interest supporting the government’s desire to secure a First 
Amendment waiver.  In addition, the public employee cases take 
pains to distinguish the government’s role as employer from the 
government’s role as censor, a dichotomy not present in this 
context.102 
Accordingly, any terms of use utilized by a municipality for 
governing access to its network, and in particular the network 
operator’s ability to bar uses and users, must be limited to avoid this 
constitutional problem.  Any waiver from suit in the State’s terms of 
use should be circumscribed to those content-neutral, technically 
based disconnections associated with network management and 
maintenance.  If a municipality does choose to limit certain content-
based uses on its network, then those uses should be limited to the 
few categories of unprotected speech that the government may 
circumscribe because of its content, such as incitement, obscenity, 
false advertising, and copyright infringement.  One such example, to 
                                                                                                     
 99. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180–83 (1972) (holding that a public 
university’s decision to deny a student organization recognition burdened the group, 
even though the group could associate with prospective members in other ways); 
Autor v. Pritzker, 740 F.3d 176, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing Healy). 
 100. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980). 
 101. Id. at 516. 
 102. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142–44 (1983). 
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end this Article where we began, is in the terms of service for the 
Harlem WiFi network.  In those terms, Sky-Packets, the private ISP 
and network manager, informs prospective users that: 
[T]he Network is open to anyone, and individual activity and 
content on the network is not limited, screened, or monitored. This 
means that network users may access Internet sites that are harmful, 
graphic, or offensive. The network does not filter or block any 
sites.  . . .  Sky-Packets is not responsible for policing the Internet or 
for an Internet user’s activity online [and] Sky-Packets upholds and 
affirms the right of adults to have access to constitutionally-
protected materials and means of expression.103 
CONCLUSION 
As we have all learned over the past two years, the Internet has 
boosted the power and efficiency of the government’s mass 
surveillance apparatus such that any presumptions concerning the 
privacy of online speech have been overwhelmed by the State’s 
technological ability to monitor, amass, and crunch personal data.  
Based on what we now know of the surveillance state, the question of 
whether the government can collect information shared online is 
moot; the debate has already turned to setting the proper limits on its 
use of that information.104 
In light of these sobering developments, one could easily conclude 
that the last thing we should be doing is enabling or encouraging 
governments to provide online networks for us to use for speech.  We 
have seen what the State has shown itself capable of and willing to do 
in the surveillance context over private communications networks.  
Based on that experience, it would be naïve at best to think it would 
not bring those same attitudes to bear on monitoring and censoring 
speech over its own networks, where its efforts would be far more 
efficacious.  In order to protect speech to the greatest degree possible, 
the most speech-protective position might be for the State to stay out 
of the speech carriage business altogether. 
I am not so sure.  Many governments have been unable to resist the 
temptation to censor speech by exercising control over information 
                                                                                                     
 103. Harlem Outdoor WiFi Network Terms of Use (eff. December 2013) (on file 
with author).  The use of the term “adult” is not accidental; the Harlem WiFi Terms 
of Use also state that the network “is intended for use by persons 18 years or older, 
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 104. See PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC’NS TECHS., 
LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD (Dec. 12, 2013), 
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communications technology.  It is thus dangerous to assume that 
more digital speech will lead to a fuller marketplace of ideas, greater 
self-fulfillment, and more informed political choices.  However, it also 
is difficult, as well as overly pessimistic, to conclude that technological 
change necessarily comes at the expense of free speech. 
 The First Amendment is not self-enforcing.  Well-crafted network 
management principles can help ensure that speech carried via 
government-provided ICT is adequately protected, so long as those 
principles are (i) informed by traditional rules on content neutrality 
and prior restraint, but also (ii) mindful of both technology’s 
particular capacity to repress expression ex ante and the State’s 
innate impulse to monitor, censor, or otherwise control the 
dissemination of ideas.  Critically, however, those rules should be in 
place before the wires are laid and antennas are raised.  If we design 
and implement communications networks with the freedom of speech 
in mind, we can be more confident that these new digital speech 
spaces are actually the enablers of expression, galvanization, 
interactivity, and change that we believe them to be. 
